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A MODEL FOR SMALL BUSINESS
FINANCING: THE CANADA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
I. Introduction
Development finance institutions which provide equity capital
have been used to stimulate economic growth worldwide.1 The
potential uses for equity development finance organizations in the
United States have been recognized.2 Probably the most dramatic
use, and one with broad economic ramifications is the establish-
ment of an equity development finance institution to correct im-
perfections in the private capital market system of this country.
One of the major flaws of the American capital market has been
that the supply of capital for new small sized businesses has been
artificially scarce.s
The failure to adequately direct capital to new smaller sized
businesses creates high social costs. Empirical research shows that
new small enterprises provide a majority of the new jobs in the
United States economy.4 The evidence available also demonstrates
that although the smaller sized business is extremely volatile and
therefore presents a greater element of risk to investors,5 the small
firm nevertheless promises a higher expected rate of return than
do medium or large firms.6
The focus of this Note will be, first to examine the reasons that
the private capital market has failed to be an adequate source of
1. See B. DANIELS & L. LITVAK, INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 111 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE]; J. NYHART & E. JANSSENS, A GLOBAL
DIRECTORY OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1967).
2. Proposed Amendments to the Small Business Investment Act of 1958: Hearings on
H.R. 12666 Before the Subcomm. on Capital Investment and Business Opportunities, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 12666].
3. Proposed Amendments to the Small Business Investment Act of 1958: Hearings on
H.R. 9549 Before the Subcomm. on Capital Investment and Business Opportunities, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978).
4. See note 9 infra and accompanying text.
5. See note 22 infra and accompanying text. See also H.R. 12666, supra note 2, at 11.
"[lInvesting in small companies is a very high risk and difficult business." (Testimony of
Russel Carson, member, executive committee, National Association of Small Business
Investment Companies). Id.
6. See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
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equity capital for new small businesses. Second, this Note will re-
view the structure and operations of the Canada Development Cor-
poration, a development finance institution which makes equity in-
vestments in the Canadian economy. Finally, this Note will make
recommendations as to how an equity development finance corpo-
ration modeled after the Canada Development Corporation, could
be established in the United States to increase the availability of
equity capital for small businesses.
II. Failures of the Private Capital Market
Small businesses comprise ninety-seven percent of all unincorpo-
rated and incorporated businesses in the United States.7 They gen-
erate more than half of all business receipts and employ in excess
of fifty percent of the American work force.8 New small businesses
provide both a vital source of new jobs in the economy9 and the
potential for a greater than average return to their investors.10
Because of the many barriers small businesses face in obtaining
needed capital, 1 they are placed in an environment in which it is
difficult to exist.1 2
In order to maximize growth potential, an enterprise must be
able to obtain different types of capital at various stages in its exis-
tence.13 Initially, a small firm may not generate a profit but will
nevertheless require a source of cash flow in order to meet operat-
7. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, REPORT OF THE SBA TASK FORCE ON VENTURE
AND EQUITY CAPITAL FOR SMALL BUSINESS 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as VENTURE AND EQUITY
CAPITAL].
8. Id.
9. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 1, at 25 ("66% of the 'replacement'
jobs are created by enterprises employing fewer than 20 people. More than 50% are gener-
ated by small independent firms. Fully 80% are created by establishments under four
years of age. Relatively few 'replacement' jobs are created by middle-sized or large firms.").
Id. (emphasis in original). See also M. KIESCHNICK, VENTURE CAPITAL AND URBAN DEVELOP-
MENT 17 (1979) [hereinafter cited as VENTURE CAPITAL AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT].
10. See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 17-40 infra and accompanying text.
12. H. HOVEY, DEVELOPMENT FINANCING FOR DISTRESSED AREAS 18-21 (1979) (prepared
for the Northeast-Midwest Inst.) (hereinafter cited as FINANCING FOR DISTRESSED AREAS].
13. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 1, at 38. If a young firm is fore-
closed from obtaining one of these types of capital, it "can have the same effect as depriving
a developing organism of a vital nutrient." Id. See also B. DANIELS & M. KIESCHNICK, THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE IN THE DESIGN OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INNOVATIONS (Working Papers
drafted for the Council of State Planning Agencies) 31-32 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978
WORKING PAPERS].
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ing costs, engage in research and development or acquire plant and
equipment. 4 Equity capital is an ideal type of financing for the
young firm because it provides the firm with needed funds but
does not impose an immediate repayment obligation.1' Rather, eq-
uity investors expect a pro rata share once the firm generates in-
come.16 Debt financing, on the other hand, requires the firm to
make fixed periodic payments of interest and principal regardless
of profitability and may be a difficult strain on the young firm's
limited funds.17 Moreover, a young firm may find it difficult to ob-
tain debt financing because it frequently has little collateral with
which to secure the debt and has no history of earnings perform-
ance on which the creditor can rely.' 8
Although equity capital is an attractive means of financing from
the perspective of both the investor' and the new business, 0 im-
perfections in the capital market system have all but eliminated
equity investments in small companies."' There are four main fac-
14. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 1, at 38. Because it is difficult for
small new businesses to obtain capital from outside sources, organizers of these entities are.
forced to rely on personal savings. In a study conducted on 100 small new firms located in
four American cities, it was discovered that 81% of start-up capital for these businesses
came from the personal savings of its organizers. Kieschnick, Policies to Support New
Businesses, COMMENTARY, July, 1980, at 22 [hereinafter cited as Policies to Support New
Businesses].
15. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 1, at 38. Because a return need
not be repaid immediately, equity is sometimes referred to as "patient money." Id.
16. Id. In theory, there is no ceiling on the rate of return of an equity investment.
17. Id. Debt is precisely the wrong kind of capital for small young firms. The burden of
debt service requirements in a cash crunch frequently makes the difference between survival
and failure of the firm. Equity capital, because it is more "patient" than debt financing,
would allow a business to survive a shortage of cash and to resume profitable growth. Poli-
cies to Support New Businesses, supra note 14, at 23.
18. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 1, at 38. Once the firm establishes
itself as a profitable entity, it can then begin to rely on debt to a greater extent. Id. To
insure continued growth and to avoid cash flow problems, however, the repayment period
should be spread out over a sufficiently long period of time, and a reasonable debt-to-equity
ratio should be maintained. Id.
19. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
20. See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
21. It is alarming that venture and expansion capital for new and growing small busi-
nesses has become almost invisible in America today. In 1972 there were 418 under-
writings for companies with a net worth of less than $5 million. In 1975 there were
four such underwritings. The 1972 offerings raised $918 million. The 1975 offerings
brought in $16 million. Over that same period of time, smaller offerings under the
Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Regulation A fell from $256 million to
$49 million and many of them were unsuccessful. While this catastrophic decline was
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tors which prevent small firms from obtaining equity capital: first,
the risk associated with investment in a small firm; second, the in-
creasingly conservative investment strategy of venture capital
firms; third, the high transaction costs faced by a small new firm
that is "going public"; and finally, the increased dominance of the
securities market by institutional investors.
Investors are unwilling to provide equity to small ventures be-
cause of the high risk associated with the investment.2 2 Although
small entities tend to offer a greater rate of return on investment
than do investments in large corporations, s the possible range of
returns for any individual investment is much greater for a small
venture than for its large counterpart.2 4 Because investors tend to
be risk-averse, they forego the opportunity to invest in small en-
tities with a high profit potential and choose the more stable in-
vestment in a large corporation, although it provides a lower rate
occurring, new money raised for all corporations in the public security markets in-
creased almost 50% from $28 billion to over $41 billion.
VENTURE AND EQUITY CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 1.
22. Litvak, New Development Finance Techniques, COMMENTARY, Apr., 1980, at 18.
23. H.R. 12666, supra note 2, at 11; 1978 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 13, at 80-86. For
the period 1972-1976, small corporations significantly outperformed all other corporations
with regard to the return they provided on equity investments. During this time period,
those corporations which had total assets of less than $1 million had an average annual
return on equity of 16.2%; corporations with total assets of between $1 million and $5 mil-
lion dollars had a rate of return of 14.22%; corporations with assets of between $5 millio
and $10 million dollars returned 12.3%; corporations with assets between $10 million and
$25 million returned 11.76%; corporations with assets between $25 million and $50 million
returned 11.2%; corporations with assets between $50 million and $100 million returned
11.5%; corporations with assets between $100 million and $250 million returned 11.58%;
corporations with assets between $250 million and $1 billion returned 12.48%; and finally, .
corporations with assets in excess of $1 billion had a rate of return on equity of 12.88%. Id.
at 80, 83.
24. From the point of view of investors, risk arises because of uncertainty about the
rate of return that will result from an investment. A venture with more uncertainty
(that is, a larger variance) about the expected rate of return is [a] more risky invest-
ment. The expected rate of return is simply the weighted average of all possible out-
comes. Two investments may have exactly the same expected rate of return, but will
differ in risk because of the dispersion (or variance) in possible outcomes around the
expected rate of return.
1978 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 13, at 44.
25. Id. A risk-averse investor is one who is willing to accept a lower return on his invest-
ment as long as the risk of the investment is low. A risk-neutral investor, however, will
choose an investment based solely on its rate of return. See also THE NATIONAL RURAL
CENTER, DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS Part I at 15 (1979) [herein-
after cited as DEVELOPMENT FINANCE PRIMER]. '
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of return. By establishing a mechanism which will pool the risks of
small companies, it would be possible to provide the investor with
the opportunity to obtain an above-average return while eliminat-
ing any excess risk which an individual investment presents." A
risk-pooling mechanism would reduce the variability of an individ-
ual investor's return by spreading the risk among several investors
participating in a portfolio of equity investments in many
companies."
The second factor which prevents small firms from obtaining
equity financing is the current conservative investment strategy of
venture capital firms. This strategy has been reflected by a sparse
number of equity investments in young firms.28 Even when venture
capital firms 29 invest in profitable young firms, they cannot realize
26. 1978 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 13, at 46-47. The pooling of investments can actu-
ally reduce the variability of an investor's overall rate of return as long as the return on the
different investments in the portfolio are somewhat independent. The randomness of the
returns of the different investments in the portfolio will cancel each other out, thus reducing
variablity.
Capital market theorists divide risk into two categories, systematic and non-systematic
risk. Systematic risk is the fluctutation in the return of investments that is caused by swings
in the national economy. Pooling of investments will have no effect on eliminating system-
atic risk. Non-systematic risk, however, is the variability of return on investment that is
unique to that investment. It is the non-systematic risks in a portfolio that are offset by
holding several investments in a portfolio. See also INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE,
supra note 1, at 19-20.
27. 1978 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 13, at 45. Spreading risks over a large population
effectively lowers the potential loss (or gain) any individual faces. See generally INNOVA-
TIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 1, at 20; DEVELOPMENT FINANCE PRIMER, supra
note 25, part I at 15; FINANCING FOR DISTRESSED AREAS, supra note 12, at 53. The Council of
State Planning Officials has suggested that a "National Venture Capital Mutual Fund" be
created, which would serve as a risk pooling device used to stimulate added investment by
venture capitalists in new small businesses. FINANCING FOR DISTRESSED AREAS, supra note
12, at 53.
28. See note 32 infra and accompanying text. According to the Small Business Adminis-
tration Task Force:
Most venture capital firms have adopted a policy of staying away from start-ups and
have put their available capital in safer and more liquid investments. The Task Force
believes this steady shift towards a more conservative investment policy comes from
perceived difficulty in recycling investment funds as restrictions on the access of
small and growing business to the public securities markets has become more costly
and difficult.
VENTURE AND EQUITY CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 7.
29. It should be noted that in addition to venture capital firms, small business invest-
ment companies also specialize in investing in small companies. See The Small Business
Investment Act, 15 U.S.C. § 661 (1976). In 1977 approximately 300 Small Business Invest-
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the appreciated value of their investment because the equity inter-
est in such firms is usually not marketable.30 Because it is so diffi-
cult to sell equity investments in small firms to secondary buyers,
venture capital does not provide an adequate source of funds for
small corporations.3 1 By 1975 only five percent of venture capital-
ists' investments went to start-ups of new ventures.32
The third factor inhibiting equity investment in small firms is
the high transaction costs incurred by a small firm when it goes
public.33 The high costs of registration will very often be the single
factor which prevents a small company from issuing securities on
the public market. A review of six of the smaller offerings by com-
panies with assets of less than five million dollars in 1976 shows an
ment Companies (SBIC's) with a total private capital of $400 million were in operation.
Turner, SBICs, MESBICs and Conflicts of Interest, 36 FED. B.J. 185, 187 (1977). There has
been a recent trend, however, for SBIC's to provide debt rather than equity to small busi-
nesses. VENTURE AND EQUITY CAPrrAL, supra note 7, at 12.
30. VENTURE CAPITAL AND URBAN DEVELOPMzNT, supra note 9, at 49-50.
Venture capitalists are the sector of the capital markets most oriented to financing
new companies. When they invest in a new company, they typically provide equity in
order to have the possibility of high returns to cover losses on many of their invest-
ments. While the definition of equity is the right to a share of new income, very few
young firms pay out any of their net income as dividends to stockholders, choosing
instead to retain the earnings for investment. Hence the venture capitalist who has
invested equity does not reap the high return through dividends but by selling, at
some future time, his shares - his right to future income. In the late 1960's, venture
capitalists were able to sell their shares in young companies at high multiples of their
initial investment because many firms they had financed were able to 'go public.' This
means that the firm sold its shares to a large number of investors who then were able
to trade them on 'public' stock exchanges such as the American Stock Exchange or
the New York Stock Exchange. This mechanism provided the liquidity needed for the
venture capitalist to reap a profit.
For most of the last decade, an extremely small number of companies has been able
to go public for a number of reasons:
First, investors are more concerned about risk than a decade ago. Second, the stock
market is generally lower, which means that investors will pay a lower price for the
right to share in earnings of any company. Third, a number of investment bankers
who specialized in helping young companies go public have failed or been acquired by
larger firms. Hence, most young companies are deterred from going public at all. For
those few firms who do go public, capital is significantly more expensive than a
decade ago.
Id. (emphasis in original).
31. H.R. 12666, supra note 2, at 12.
32. VENTURE AND EQUITY CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 7.
33. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 1, at 39-42.
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average registration cost of $122,350."1 The high cost of registra-
tion"5 will have a greater adverse affect on a small company seek-
ing to obtain capital through the issuance of securities than it will
for a large corporation. The small firm suffers a greater burden
than the large firm because the costs associated with registration
represent a higher percentage of the small firm's total underwriting
proceeds. s6
Finally, the increased dominance of the securities markets in
this country by institutional investors has also made it less feasible
for small businesses to "go public" as a means of financing opera-
tions or expansion. 7 The institutionalization of the stock market
has put a small business which wishes to obtain capital in the mar-
ket in the position of having to appeal to a professional investor
with vast sums of money and limited time to review investment
choices.3 8 In addition, the institutional investors handling pension
funds must abide by the strict standards of the 1974 Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").89 Fear of possible liabil-
34. VENTURE AND EQUITY CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 4.
35. Green & Brecher, When Making A Small Public Offering Under Regulation A, 26
PRAC. LAW. 25 (1980). Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.262 (1980), which applies to the
sale of securities up to $1.5 million, exempts a small company from many of the comprehen-
sive registration procedures required of large firms. Regulation A allows for simplified docu-
mentation, the use of unaudited financial statements and processing by a regional office of
the SEC rather than by the main office in Washington, D.C. Even those companies which
are eligible to make a public offering of securities under SEC Regulation A incur significant
transaction costs. The cost to the company of a Regulation A offering is normally 20% of
the funds raised at the offering. Green & Brecher, supra at 30.
36. INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 1, at 39-40. During the years
1971-1975 the costs of registration represented 13.74% of the proceeds obtained for an issue
of common stock between $500,000 and $1 million, while for the same time period the cost
of registration only constituted 3.95% of the proceeds for an issue between $100 million and
$500 million.
37. Id. at 40. The SBA Task Force discovered that institutional investors accounted for
70% of the volume of trading on the New York Stock Exchange in 1977. VENTURE AND
EQUITY CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 4.
38. VENTURE AND EQUITY CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 14; FINANCING FOR DISTRESSED AREAS,
supra note 12, at 15.
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976). See Little & Thraikill, Fiduciaries Under ERISA: A
Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1977); Weiler, Fiduciary Provisions of the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 36 LA. L. REV. 897 (1976); Note, Economic
Analysis and the Prudent Man Rule Under ERISA: Efficiency Versus the Public Interest,
7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 683 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Prudent Man Rule Under ERISA]; Note,
Fiduciary Standards Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 63
GEO. L.J. 1109 (1975). State pension laws controlling local pension funds may also impose
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ity under ERISA has prompted institutional investors of pension
funds to concentrate their assets in larger companies with proven
earnings and proven liquidity of investment."'
III. The Canada Development Corporation
In 1971 the Canadian government pursuant to the Canada De-
velopment Corporation Act"1 ("CDC Act") established the Canada
Development Corporation ("CDC").'2 CDC's purpose is to "help
develop and maintain strong Canadian controlled and managed
corporations in the private sector of the economy and [to]. . . give
Canadians greater opportunities to invest in the economic develop-
ment of Canada."" CDC is designed to achieve four objectives:
(a) to assist in the creation or development of businesses, resources, proper-
ties and industries of Canada;
(b) to expand, widen and develop opportunities for Canadians to participate
in the economic development of Canada through the application of their
skills and capital;
(c) to invest in the shares or securities of any corporation owning property
or carrying on business related to the economic interests of Canada; and
(d) to invest in ventures or enterprises, including the acquisition of prop-
erty, likely to benefit Canada ... "
barriers to a small business seeking equity capital. A state restriction which forbids invest-
ment of state pension funds in the stock of small firms further reduces the supply of capital
available to these firms. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53216.1 (West Supp. 1981). Under California law
state pension funds may only be invested in the common stock of a corporation with total
assets of at least $100 million and only if "[s]uch corporation has paid a cash dividend on its
common stock in at least 8 of the 10 years preceding the date of investment, and the aggre-
gate net earnings available for dividends on the common stock of such corporation for the
whole of such period have been equal to the amount of such dividends paid, and such corpo-
ration has paid an earned cash dividend in each of the last three years." Id. § 53216.1 (b),
(d). See also N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW §§ 177, 177b (McKinney Supp. 1981); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16 § 11659 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
40. VENTURE AND EQUITY CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 14. Prudent Man Rule Under
ERISA, supra note 39, at 701. "The new prudent man requirement has engendered a con-
servative reaction to investment of equity portfolios because of the fiduciary liability which
results from imprudent investment of plan assets." See Hutchinson & Cole, Legal Stan-
dards Governing Investment of Pension Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L.
REV. 1340 (1980).
41. Canada Development Corporation Act, Can. Stat. ch. 49 (1971).
42. Id. § 4. "Such persons not exceeding eighteen as may be designated by the Governor
in Council together with such persons as are shareholders of the company from time to time
are hereby incorporated as a company with share capital to be known as the 'Canada Devel-
opment Corporation.'" Id.
43. Id. § 2.
44. Id. §§ 6(1)(a)-(d).
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The CDC Act provides that these objectives are to be carried out
with profit maximization in mind."
Consistent with the nationalistic focus of the CDC Act,"6 share-
holders and directors of CDC must be either Canadian citizens or
residents.4 7 The CDC Act establishes investigative procedures by
which CDC's board of directors may determine whether an existing
shareholder, a subscriber of shares, or an individual to whom
shares are to be transferred fulfills that requirement."' If the resi-
dency or citizenship requirement is not met, shares owned by the
individual in question will be deemed to be held in contravention
of the corporate charter and that person will thereby be stripped
45. Id. §§ 6(1)d, (2). The CDC may make investments so far as it is practical and profit-
able to do so. Furthermore, CDC is authorized to have a capital structure consisting of (a)
two hundred million shares of no par value common stock; and (b) one billion dollars of
preferred shares with a nominal or par value in any multiple of five dollars not exceeding
the par value of one thousand dollars each. The preferred shares may be issued in one or
more series. Id. § 9(1)(a)-(b).
46. For a discussion of the political mood of Canada which led to the creation of CDC
and for an in depth analysis of the structure of CDC see Couzin, The Canada Development
Corporation: A Comparative Appraisal, 17 MCGILL L.J. 405 (1971).
47. Canada Development Corporation Act, Can. Stat. ch. 49 § 20 (1971). The board of
directors may prescribe rules for determining when a person is to be considered a resident of
Canada. Id. § 20(3). Although an individual may be either a Canadian citizen or resident in
order to become a CDC shareholder, an individual must be a Canadian citizen to be eligible
for the position of CDC director. Id. § 12. In addition, the majority of the members of the
board of directors must at all times be residents of Canada. Id. Until otherwise changed
through an amendment to the CDC's by-laws the board of directors shall consist of not less
than 18 or more than 21 directors. The exact number within this range shall be fixed from
time to time by the board. Id. § 11.
48. Id. § 16(2). Upon a request of the board of directors, shareholders may be required
to submit a declaration regarding (a) the shareholders' direct or indirect ownership of CDC
shares; (b) whether the shareholder and any person in whose right or for whose use or bene-
fit the shares are held are Canadian citizens or residents; (c) whether the shareholder is
"associated" with any other shareholders; (d) whether the shareholder is a Canadian citizen;
(e) whether shareholders which are corporations or trusts are Canadian residents; and (f)
other matters which the board deems to be relevant. In addition,
[wihere a declaration has been requested by the Board from a shareholder under this
section and the shareholder fails or neglects to submit to the Board a declaration
satisfactory to the Board within thirty days of the day that the declaration was re-
quested by the Board, the shares of the company held by such shareholder shall be
deemed to be held in contravention of the charter of the company until a declaration
satisfactory to the Board has been submitted.
Id. § 16(3). Shares will also be deemed to be held in contravention of CDC's charter if, after
60 days following the purchase or other acquistion of any shares, the stqck certificate has
not been presented to CDC for transfer into the name of the beneficial owner. Id. § 17(6).
See also id. § 16(5)-(6).
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of his voting rights. e In addition to a loss of voting rights, share-
holders holding stock in contravention of the corporate charter
may be given notice to dispose of their shares to someone qualified
to hold voting shares. 0 In lieu of such disposition, CDC may at its
option redeem and cancel the shares."'
Although CDC is designed to encourage investment participation
by the citizens and residents of Canada, the federal government is
intended to be the largest single shareholder.2 This is evidenced
by the fact that individual shareholders are prohibited from hold-
ing in their own name or for their "use or benefit" more than three
percent of CDC's outstanding voting shares.53 On the other hand,
the government is permitted to own ten percent or more of CDC's
outstanding voting shares."
Even the government, however, has limits on its ability to invest
in CDC. If at any time the total number of voting shares of CDC
held by the government of Canada exceeds ten percent of the out-
standing voting shares, then CDC may at its sole option redeem for
cancellation any number of those shares in excess of the ten
percent figure. 5 Although this measure provides CDC with a
means of limiting the Canadian government's control over it, the
CDC Act provides
[slo far as it is in the public interest to do so, the Minister of Finance shall
49. Id. § 19(1).
50. Id. § 21(1)-(2). The type of notice required to be given to the shareholder will be
prescribed by the by-laws of the corporation but in no event will the shareholder have less
than 60 days to dispose of his stock.
51. Id. CDC may redeem shares held in contravention by depositing the redemption
price, see id. §§ 21(6), 22, in a special bank account and then, to effectuate the redemption,
CDC must give the shareholder notice that those shares were redeemed. Id. § 21(2)(a)-(b). If
CDC discovers that any shares which are held in contravention have been in contravention
for ten years (or less, if specified in the by-laws), then CDC must redeem the shares. Id. §
21(5).
52. The CDC Act provides that the Minister of Finance is authorized to subscribe for or
purchase up to $250 million worth of shares of CDC for the government of Canada. Id. §§
35(1)(a), 36(1)(a). The federal government is also authorized to make loans to CDC with a
maximum outstanding balance of $100 million. Id. § 37(1)-(2).
53. Id. Schedule I § 2(1).
54. Id. § 36(1). The Canadian government is expressly authorized to own in excess of
10% of the total issued and outstanding voting shares of CDC subject to certain conditions.
The government's right to own up to 10% of the issued and outstanding shares of the CDC
is unrestricted. Id.
55. Id. § 36(1)(b).
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endeavor to maintain the percentqge of voting shares of the company held
by Her Majesty in right of Canada at any time at not less than ten per cent
of the total number of issued and outstanding shares of the company; and
the Minister of Finance shall not dispose of any voting shares of the com-
pany if the disposition would reduce the percentage of voting shares held by
Her Majesty in right of Canada to less than ten per cent of the total num-
ber of issued and outstanding shares of the company."
In addition to insuring that the Canadian government be the single
largest shareholder of CDC, the Act created a special relationship
between the government and CDC's board of directors. The Minis-
ter of Finance has the option to forego voting the shares he con-
trols for the government, regardless of the government's holdings
in CDC, and may instead appoint a maximum of four directors to
the board.5 7 Whenever the government of Canada owns more than
fifty percent of the outstanding shares of CDC, the Deputy Minis-
ter of Finance and the Deputy Minister of Industry, Trade and
Commerce automatically become members of the board ex officio,5s
a solely advisory position.
The House of Commons debates regarding CDC, conducted just
prior to its enactment reflect that Canadian economic development
was only one of several reasons for establishing CDC.5 Opponents
of CDC were suspicious that any concern for economic develop-
ment would be subordinated to an interest in profit maximization 0
for the benefit of CDC's shareholders.61 Nevertheless, the CDC Act
was enacted largely because of the Canadian government's fear of
56. Id. § 42(3).
57. Id. § 40.
58. Id. § 41. Members of the board ex officio are not entitled to vote at board meetings,
but this provision does enable the government to have an additional means of overseeing
their investment and an opportunity to provide input and ideas. If the Deputy Minister of
Finance or the Deputy Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce is unable to serve as a
board member ex officio, then the minister of the department concerned shall appoint a
replacement from within the department.
59. 3 Parl. Deb., H.C. 6384-85, 6391 (Can., 1971).
60. For a discussion regarding the inconsistency of CDC's professing profit maximization
and Canada's economic development as simultaneous objectives, see D. Lapres, The Canada
Development Corporation: A Proposal To Reconcile Its Conflict of Objectives, 9 J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 507 (1974).
61. 3 Parl. Deb., H.C. 6377 (Can., 1971). "The corporation is to make profits. Its objec-
tives are not compatible with national objectives and national purposes. The government is
hamstringing the corporation from the beginning. . . . The objectives of the corporation
cannot be reconciled with the national interest." Id. (statement of Max Saltsman). See also
id. at 6382-83, 6385.
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and desire to eliminate foreign domination of Canadian resources
and industry.2 The debates also pointed out that offering CDC
stock to Canadians would help to alleviate the shortage of invest-
ment opportunities available to them." Members of the House
hoped that CDC would reduce the short supply of domestic invest-
ments.' In 1973 CDC made its first major effort to reduce foreign
control of Canadian resources." CDC focused its efforts on Texas-
gulf corporation,"' a Texas-based international mining firm whose
principal business is base metal mining in Canada. 7 In 1975, CDC
entered into a $114 million agreement with Tenneco Inc., another
American corporation, to purchase from Tenneco several of Ten-
neco's Canadian oil and gas holdings."
Shortly after its enactment, CDC's chairman tried to give
Canadians an indication of CDC's investment plan by announcing
six major areas of investment concentration. The chairman stated
that CDC would concentrate its investments in oil and gas; health
62. Id. at 6384-85 (statement of David Lewis).
63. Id. at 6378 (statement of Max Saltsman). Mr. Saltsman noted: "There is a great
need for publicly traded stocks in Canada. . . . There is also a great deal of investment
money in Canada, but it is not being invested in this country because the stocks are not
available. . . . There is twice as much money available as there are stocks."
64. Id. at 6391 (statement of P.M. Mahoney).
65. Canadians' concern over the high level of foreign investment in Canada led to the
passage of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Can. Stat. ch. 46 (1973), as amended by The
Immigration Act, 1976, Can. Stat. ch. 52 (1976). For a discussion of the above-mentioned
legislation, see Note, Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act Revisited, 4 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 175 (1980).
66. Texasgulf's management was opposed to CDC's effort to obtain Texasgulf shares and
in hopes of frustrating CDC, Texasgulf sought a preliminary injunction restraining CDC
from proceeding with the tender offer. The injunction was denied and CDC was allowed to
purchase the Texasgulf shares. Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 430-
31 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
67. Meyer, The CDC Bid for Texasgulf: Bold, Yes; Inept, Too, EXECUTIVE, Sept., 1973,
at 47. At the time CDC made the offer to purchase Texasgulf shares, Texasgulf derived 68%
of its revenue from Canadian operations. CDC bought ten million shares of Texasguif from
American shareholders for a purchase price of $271 million and thus gained significant con-
trol of the corporation. CANADA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INFORMATION STATEMENT 2
(Oct. 16, 1980) [hereinafter cited as INFORMATION STATEMENT]. Fellows, Well, Full Marks to
the CDC for the Old College Try, ExEcUTIVE, Sept., 1973, at 47.
68. What CDC Will Buy In Its $114 Million Deal, Financial Post, Nov. 22, 1975, at 23.
Among the assets obtained in this transaction were a 50% interest of the producing oil and
gas properties operated by Tenneco's subsidiary, Tenneco Oil and Minerals Ltd. and a
100% interest in the Canadian oil and gas properties of two other Tenneco companies, Kern
County Land Company and La Terre Petroleum of Canada, Inc.
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care, including pharmaceuticals; petrochemicals; mining pipelines
and related transportation; and the venture capital industry."
In the venture capital industry CDC has played an important
role in making equity capital available to Canadian small business.
CDC's investments in the venture capital industry only represent
eight percent of the company's long-term investments as of De-
cember 31, 1979.70 Nevertheless, CDC has built "the largest single
pool of venture capital financing available in Canada."'1  CDC's
1977 Annual Report stated:
Our catalytic function in encouraging the survival and growth of profitable
small businesses throughout Canada is particularly significant during a pe-
riod in which the venture capital industry has shrunk, making it difficult for
entrepeneurs with fresh ideas to fulfill their potential.
The CDC directors decided as early as 1972 to stimulate Canadian enter-
prise by providing small firms with start-up capital to support their product
development and market expansion."I
CDC's initial venture capital investments were made directly in
three venture capital firms which acted as intermediaries for sup-
plying equity capital to small businesses.7 3 CDC's management re-
alized that by making investments in venture capital enterprises,
CDC would be stimulating the growth of small businesses without
having to review numerous individual requests for small7 4 amounts
of financial aid.75 To date CDC has invested in six venture capital
69. CDC Begins to Flex Its Muscles, CANADIAN Bus., Oct., 1972, at 4.
70. INFORMATION STATEMENT, supra note 67, at 2. CDC's total long-term investments
were $782.3 million (valued at cost as of Dec. 31, 1979).
71. [1977] CDC Ann. Rep. 11.
72. Id.
73. Id. CDC's initial capital investment in these three firms, Venturetek International
Limited, Ventures West Capital Ltd., and CanWest Capital Corp., amounted to $10.4 mil-
lion. INFORMATION STATEMENT, supra note 67, at 3-4. These venture capital firms have in-
vested in more than 25 entities in such diverse areas as word processing, oil and gas explora-
tion and the soft drink industry. Id.
74. Canada Development Corporation Act, Can. Stat. ch 49 § 6(2)(b) (1971). The CDC
Act provides: "[T]he company shall, so far as it is practicable to do so ... invest, in the
shares of corporations in each of which, in the opinion of the Board of Directors of the
company, the real value of the stockholders' equity after investment by the company will be,
or is likely to become, one million dollars more." Id. This section of the CDC Act effectively
limits the size of target companies in which CDC may invest. Therefore, CDC must use
intermediaries if it wishes to make equity capital available to corporations in which equity
investments would be less than one million dollars.
75. CDC Begins to Flex its Muscles, CANADIAN Bus., Oct. 1972, at 4.
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firms. 76 In addition, the president of CDC has indicated that CDC
intends to promote actively the formation of a number of new ven-
ture capital firms thoughout Canada."
Initially, CDC was funded solely by government investment. It
was not until several years later that CDC sold any of its shares to
Canadian investors.7 ' The first sale of CDC shares involved a pri-
vate placement of $100 million in 1974.79 It was not until 1975,
however, that CDC made its first public offering of CDC shares.
That offering, which realized more than $141 million was at the
time the largest equity issue that had ever been underwritten in
Canada.80 The dollar volume of the 1975 issue was surpassed on
October 15, 1980 when, CDC engaged in an underwriting of $310
million of preferred shares.'"
Prior to the 1980 issue, private Canadian investors owned 34.2%
of the voting rights in CDC.82 As a result of the 1980 issue, how-
ever, this ownership has increased to a majority of 50.1%. 8 Al-
though private investors have a technical majority of voting shares,
because the government remains the largest single shareholder,'4 it
76. INFORMATION STATEMENT, supra note 67, at 3-4. See also note 73 supra. See Address
by H. Anthony Hampson, President and Chief Executive Officer, Canada Development Cor-
poration to the Canadian Club of Edmonton, Alberta at 3 (May 28, 1980).
77. Address by H. Anthony Hampson, President and Chief Executive Offficer, Canada
Development Corporation to the Canadian Club of Edmonton, Alberta at 3 (May 28, 1980).
78. INFORMATION STATEM-NT, supra note 67, at 5.
79. Id. In March 1974, CDC issued 10 million shares of 5.75% class A preferred stock to
a number of financial institutions and business corporations for $100 million.
80. Id. On October 1, 1975, 1,416,644 shares of class B preferred stock were issued to
investors through a public offering for $141,664,400. An additional 8,713 class B shares were
subsequently subscribed for. In April of 1975, 48 common shares were issued in exchange for
four class B preferred shares. The exchange marked the first time common shares were held
by a non-governmental investor. During the years 1977 and 1978, an additional 132 common
shares were issued on conversion of class B preferred shares. In 1979 CDC made a distribu-
tion of 1,447,690 common shares to the holders of class B preferred stock. During the same
year 1,476 common shares were issued as a result of additional conversions of class B pre-
ferred stock. See also Jamieson, By Gosh But (Second Time Around) The Price was Right,
Financial Post, Sept. 6, 1975, at 13.
81. [1980] CDC THIR QUARTzR Rsp. 3. CDC tried to promote the expansion of its
shareholder base during this offering by establishing a widespread sales network and an
installment purchase plan for small investors. Id. The purchase plan was used by 1,930 in-
vestors who purchased 251,000 shares.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
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is likely that the government will still maintain effective voting
control.8 5
IV. An American Model of CDC
An equity development finance corporation similar to CDC in
structure and organized to combat imperfections in the capital
market would provide a viable solution to the problem small
American businesses face in obtaining equity capital. There are
several features of the CDC, however, which would be inapplicable
in an American version of the CDC and therefore ought to be elim-
inated. First, because an American equity development finance en-
tity would be primarily concerned with providing small new busi-
nesses with equity capital and not with eliminating foreign
ownership of American resources and industry, the American coun-
terpart to the CDC would not require that shareholders and direc-
tors be American citizens or residents. Second, although American
venture capital firms have an adequate supply of funds, they have
failed to make significant investments in small new businesses."
Therefore, the American counterpart to the CDC should invest di-
rectly in these small new businesses and thus eliminate the CDC's
intermediate investment in those venture capital firms which in
turn invest in the small new businesses.8 7
85. A shareholder can exercise substantial control over a corporation even if the share-
holder owns less than 50% of the outstanding shares. The notion that providing for govern-
ment ownership of no more than 49% of a corporation voting stock will protect the private
investors is fallacious. See, e.g., Alaska Renewable Resources Corporation, ALASKA STAT.
§ 37.12.080(2) (1980), which states that in providing financial assistance this development
corporation may not "invest in more than 49 per cent of the outstanding corporate stock or
other corporate obligations issued by an applicant." Id.
In Berk, Control In Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1958), it is noted that
Control is a function of the ownership of voting stock. There are two discernable
types, absolute or outright control, and working control. 'Absolute control' exists
when a majority of such stock is held by a single owner or by a few stockholders who
by agreement or tacit consent act together. The same situation in fact exists where a
very large minority is so held, while ownership of the majority is dispersed among
many small holders. Fifty-one per cent of ownership of the voting stock in a single
hand or compact group constitutes absolute control. Forty per cent ownership may be
no less absolute if the remaining sixty per cent is split among hundreds or thousands
of small stockholders.
Id. at 1213. See also Santon, The Developing Duties of Controlling Shareholders and Ap-
propriate Restraints on the Sale of Corporate Control, 4 J. CoRp. L. 285, 287 (1979).
86. See notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
87. The venture capital industry in the United States has an adequate supply of funds
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An American equity development finance corporation formed to
stimulate small business growth could alleviate the conditions
which lead to market failure by making the needed equity invest-
ments previously unavailable to young ventures."8 Once the inap-
plicable features of CDC are eliminated from the American model,
the four previous barriers to investment in small business could be
eliminated. First, an equity development finance corporation
whose shares are offered to both the public and private sectors
would be able to make investments in a large number of small
companies, thereby pooling the risk of each individual investment
and thus spreading the risk among all the investors in the develop-
ment corporation. Risk-pooling would minimize the risk faced by
an individual investor who invests in one small company." At the
same time, investors would be able to enjoy the above average re-
turns associated with small entities.90 Second, because an Ameri-
can equity development finance corporation would be a large, pub-
licly-traded issue, it would also eliminate the liquidity problems
which exist with investments in small companies.9 1 An investor
would be able to invest in small ventures by using the development
corporation as a conduit and enjoy the marketability of his shares
in the development corporation.2 Third, the size of the develop-
ment corporation might render it an attractive investment oppor-
tunity for institutional investors.98 Finally, because the American
equity development finance corporation would specialize in making
numerous equity investments in small companies, economies of
but have chosen to limit the extent of their equity investments in new small companies. See
note 28 supra and accompanying text. An American version of CDC would need to invest
directly in small companies in order to insure that the shortage of equity capital available to
small businesses is alleviated.
88. See notes 17-40 supra and accompanying text.
89. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text. An investment in an entity such as
CDC is very similar to an investment in a mutual fund. See Note, Mutual Fund Advisory
Fees - Too Much For Too Little? 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 530 (1980), describing a mutual
fund as "an investment company that purchases securities with the capital contributed by
its shareholders. Participation in a fund provides relatively small investors with professional
money management and the advantages of a diverse portfolio of securities." Id. at 531.
90. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
91. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
92. [1980] CDC THIRD QUARTER RaP. 3. The strong demand for CDC shares by Canadian
investors demonstrates the potential marketability of shares in a development finance
corporation.
93. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
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scale and specialization would reduce the transaction costs a small
firm encounters when trying to obtain funds.9 4
The potential for high returns and liquidity of investment
should attract a large number of private sector investors to an
American equity development finance corporation. Because the
majority of its funding would come from the private sector, unlike
the CDC, 95 the development corporation would not require sub-
stantial sums of public money which would otherwise be available
for other social programs." The motivation of private investors to
maximize profit will also alleviate the fears of small companies that
investments by the development corporation will be dominated by
political motivations." However, the presence of the government
as a shareholder and, through representation on the board of direc-
tors, would help to insure that investments are made in a manner
consistent with the purpose of the development corporation."8
94. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
95. See notes 52, 54 supra and accompanying text.
96. If the bulk of the funding for the American version of CDC came from the federal
government then the issue could be raised whether the government was pursuing a public
purpose or simply acting for the benefit of corporate shareholders. See generally United
States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977) (federal property when used for the benefit
of private individuals is not exempt from state taxation); United States v. City of Detroit,
355 U.S. 466 (1958); United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); City of
Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
97. See Policies to Support New Businesses, supra note 14, at 23, where the author
noted:
Many owners of small firms will object to public investment when it means giving up
a share of the business. Since the typical small businessperson is already wary of the
public sector, partial public ownership may seem quite frightening. To some extent,
these concerns reflect the very real possibility that direct public investment could be
manipulated for political reasons.
Id.
98. In theory, the presence of those directors who directly represent the government's
interest in CDC would be able to prevent the CDC from engaging in those transactions
which are not consistent with CDC's purpose. An example of the American government us-
ing representation on a board of directors in order to ensure that an entity conduct its
business in a manner consistent with the public interest is the Communications Satellite Act
of 1962, 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744 (1976). For a discussion which criticizes the effectiveness of
this device from the government's perspective, see Schwartz, Governmentally Appointed
Directors In a Private Corporation - The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HARv.
L. REv. 350 (1965). Under the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, three out of fifteen
board members of the COMSAT corporation are appointed by the President of the United
States for the purpose of protecting the public's interest. Although represented on the
board, the government has no proprietary interest in COMSAT. Id. To avoid this type of
representation, the government appointed ditectors of an American version of CDC should
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The president of CDC recently observed that a development cor-
poration motivated by profit has the best prospects for success.
We make no apologies for our emphasis on profits, for they are essential to
generate the internal cash flow and to attract the external capital funds that
are necessary for expansion. Moreover, they give the necessary strength to
an enterprise in a highly competitive world, are a yardstick of performance,
and a guide to efficiency.90
V. Conclusion
Traditional private market suppliers of capital have overlooked
the investment opportunities presented by new small businesses.
Therefore, alternative methods must be devised. Government initi-
ated action to form an American version of the CDC could lead to
the creation of a large capital fund available for equity financing in
small business. 100 In order to maximize efficiency, the American
version of CDC should be operated by those with an expertise in
development financing. Furthermore, the American version should
be managed with the expectation of earning a positive return on
the pool of investments in small businesses.
Marshall A. Heinberg
have an expertise in financial management in order to insure that they are able to ade-
quately protect the public interest. More recently, the federal government has taken a simi-
lar approach in the bail-out of the Chrysler Corporation. See Chrysler Loan Guarantee
Board, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1875 (Supp. III 1979). In guaranteeing loans and other assistance
to Chrysler, a board consisting of the Secretaries of Treasury, Labor and Transportation
along with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller General was
established to monitor the activities of the corporation. Id. § 1862 (Supp. III 1979). Congress
believed that this close interaction between the government and Chrysler was necessary to
adequately protect the government's interest in the corporation.
99. Address by H. Anthony Hampson, President and Chief Executive Officer, Canada
Development Corporation to the Canadian Club of Edmonton, Alberta at 2 (May 28, 1980).
100. See INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, supra note 1, at 110-11. "Any [govern-
ment] that is serious about nurturing enterprises that have been unjustifiably refused funds
from conventional sources must provide equity financing .. "
